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STUDENT ASSISTANTS AND THE NLRB: 
A CALL FOR NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING 
Andrew F. Boccio* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On August 23, 2016, student assistants1 seeking to form unions 
throughout the country scored a major victory when the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) issued its decision in Columbia 
University.2  In a 3–1 decision, the Board reversed a twelve-year-old 
precedent and held that virtually all graduate and undergraduate students 
employed by private educational institutions are statutory employees under 
the National Labor Relations Act3 (NLRA or Act).4  Columbia University 
marks the latest development in a decades-long struggle that has included 
contentious stand-offs between universities and students looking to 
unionize,5 a united front of Ivy-League schools against unionization,6 and 
numerous policy reversals by the NLRB.7 
Prior to Columbia University, student employees were excluded from 
the protections of the NLRA under the Board’s 2004 decision in Brown 
University.8  That ruling held that the Act extended only to employees whose 
primary relationship with their employer is “fundamentally economic,”9 and 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Ramapo College of New 
Jersey.  I would like to thank Professor Timothy P. Glynn for his thoughtful guidance and 
suggestions, as well as the staff of the Seton Hall Law Review for its editing assistance.  
 1  Throughout this Comment, the term “student assistants” is used to refer to all graduate 
and undergraduate students who are employed by the educational institution at which they are 
enrolled. 
 2  Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 3  29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). 
 4  Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *2. 
 5  See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden, “The University Works Because We Do”: Collective 
Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1238–42 (2001) 
(discussing student unionization efforts at Yale University and Kansas University). 
 6  Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, 
Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania, 
Princeton University, Stanford University, Yale University at 1–3, Columbia Univ., 362 
N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016) (No. 02-RC-143012). 
 7  See infra Part IV. 
 8  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004). 
 9  Id. at 488 (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999)). 
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not to workers who are “primarily students.”10  In Columbia University, the 
Board eliminated this “primary-purpose” test11 and held that the Act protects 
any student in a common-law employment relationship with his or her 
school.12 
At its most basic level, the debate over the employment status of 
students under the NLRA reflects a fundamental disagreement about the role 
of both students and universities.  Opponents of student unionization contend 
that collective bargaining threatens to undermine the primary functions of 
universities—fostering the free flow of ideas13 and allowing students to earn 
degrees as quickly and efficiently as possible.14  On the other hand, 
proponents of unionization argue that these concerns are wholly overblown 
and no compelling reason justifies treating students differently than any 
other employees.15  At the center of this disagreement is the NLRB itself.  
The Board, comprised of five presidential appointees,16 has gained notoriety 
for frequently shifting its policies when a new political party takes control of 
the executive branch.17  Exacerbating this political reality, the Board 
develops the vast majority of its policies through case-law and 
adjudication,18 which is more susceptible to reversal than the more formal 
“notice-and-comment” rulemaking favored by most other administrative 
agencies.19 
This Comment will discuss student unions, the NLRB, and the 
interaction between them to provide background and explain why a 
definitive answer on the employment status of student assistants has been so 
elusive.  It will then attempt to identify a path moving forward to ensure the 
continued protection of student assistants while making the necessary 
accommodations to address the unique position of universities in American 
society.  Part II will introduce the role of student assistants and give a brief 
 
 10  Id. at 493. 
 11  Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *5 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 12  Id. at *2.  As articulated by the Board, a common-law employment relationship “exists 
when a servant performs services for another, under the other’s control or right of control, and 
in return for payment.” Id. at *3. 
 13  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490. 
 14  Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *23 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting) (“If 
one regards college as a competition, this is one area where ‘winning isn’t everything, it is the 
only thing,’ and I believe winning in this context means fulfilling degree requirements, 
hopefully on time.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 15  Id. at *8–13 (majority opinion). 
 16  29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012). 
 17  ROBERT GORMAN, MATTHEW W. FINKIN, & TIMOTHY GLYNN, COX AND BOK’S LABOR 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 87–88 (16th ed. 2016). 
 18  N.L.R.B. v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 445 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)). 
 19  Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411, 416 
(2010). 
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overview of the history and rationales behind their fight to unionize.  Part III 
will introduce the NLRA and the Board designed to administer it, focusing 
on the Board’s structure, authority, and politically-charged nature.  Part IV 
will discuss the history of NLRB jurisprudence concerning the employment 
status of student assistants, which culminated in Columbia University.  Part 
V will call for the NLRB to exercise its notice-and-comment rulemaking 
authority to codify Columbia University and address some of the concerns 
unique to the student-employment context. 
II. GRADUATE ASSISTANTS AND THEIR FIGHT FOR UNIONIZATION 
After Columbia University, both undergraduate and graduate assistants 
have the right to form unions and collectively bargain with their 
universities;20 however, the historical push for student-unionization has been 
led by, and primarily focused on, graduate students.  At educational 
institutions across the United States, graduate students perform various 
teaching and research-related services for their universities in exchange for 
compensation.21  Increasingly, universities rely on these students to perform 
critical functions.22  This Part introduces the role of graduate assistants and 
provides a brief historical overview of their unionization efforts. 
A. The Role of Graduate Assistants 
A graduate assistant is any graduate student who works for his or her 
university while simultaneously juggling the academic workload necessary 
to pursue an advanced degree.23  In return for their services, graduate 
assistants typically receive compensation through a stipend, tuition 
reimbursement, or other form of payment.24  These assistants can be 
classified into three categories: (1) teaching assistants, (2) research 




 20  Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *2. 
 21  See generally Hayden, supra note 5, at 1250–51. 
 22  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 498 (2004) (Members Liebman and Walsh, 
dissenting). 
 23  See Neal H. Hutchens & Melissa B. Hutchens, Catching the Union Bug: Graduate 
Student Employees and Unionization, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 105, 106 (2004); Hayden, supra note 
5, at 1236. 
 24  Sheldon D. Pollack & Daniel V. Johns, Graduate Students, Unions, and Brown 
University, 20 LAB. LAW. 243, 246 (2004). 
 25  Research assistants are distinct from research associates.  Research associates perform 
work for a university after receiving their doctorates, and they are considered statutory 
employees with the right to unionize. C.W. Post Ctr., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 906–07 (1971); see 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974). 
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The typical responsibilities of a teaching assistant include teaching 
certain undergraduate classes and helping professors handle larger lecture 
classes.26  Teaching assistants may also be asked to “select textbooks, plan 
syllabi, design tests, plan lectures, plan laboratory setup, compose final 
exams, and grade all tests and projects.”27  Research assistants perform field 
and laboratory research,28 either to assist a professor or independently.29  
Funding for this research may come either from the school or from outside 
sources in the form of grants.30  The final category of graduate assistants is 
comprised of any student-employee who does not fall neatly into either of 
the above two categories, such as office assistants in administrative 
departments, and curatorial assistants in university museums.31  Depending 
on the university and the nature of the tasks performed, the work of these 
graduate assistants may or may not be a required component of earning an 
advanced degree.32 
From a university’s perspective, graduate students earn significantly 
less than full-time faculty, and schools have increasingly turned to them as 
“an attractive cost-saving measure.”33  This dependence on graduate 
assistants has “created a group of workers who demand more economic 
benefits and workplace rights.”34  The time to complete a degree has 
increased, and some students “perceive the faculty with whom they work 
with to be living in comparative luxury.”35  For nearly fifty years, graduate 
students have sought to address some of these concerns through the 
mechanisms of unionization and collective bargaining.   
 
 26  Hayden, supra note 5, at 1236. 
 27  Id. at 1236 n.12. 
 28  Id. at 1236. 
 29  See Leland Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622 (discussing how Ph.D. candidates must 
complete research projects assigned by the University before performing the independent 
research required for a doctorate). 
 30  N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1215 (2000).  Before Columbia University, this 
distinction was a relevant factor in determining whether certain assistants were statutory 
employees.  Id. 
 31  Hayden, supra note 5, at 1236 n.11. 
 32  Compare N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1207 (“[I]t is undisputed that working as a 
graduate assistant is not a requirement for obtaining a graduate degree in most departments.”) 
with Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 484 (2004) (“[M]ost university departments at Brown 
require a student to serve as a TA or RA to obtain a degree.”).  Opponents of student unions 
argue that a student who performs work that would have to be completed anyway to obtain a 
degree cannot simultaneously be considered an employee for that same work.  See Leland 
Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622–23. 
 33  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 498 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting). 
 34  Id. (citing Gordon J. Hewitt, Graduate Student Employee Collective Bargaining and 
the Educational Relationship between Faculty and Graduate Students, 29 J. COLLECTIVE 
NEGOT. PUB. SECTOR 153, 154 (2000)). 
 35  Id. (quoting Daniel J. Julius & Patricia J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: 
Catalysts and Consequences, 26 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 187, 191, 196 (2002)). 
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B. A Brief History of Graduate-Student Unions 
The history of graduate-student unions dates back to the late 1960s, 
when the University of Wisconsin-Madison voluntarily recognized a union 
of teaching assistants and entered into a collectively-bargained employment 
contract.36  Since then, graduate students at numerous public universities 
have followed suit and established unions of their own.  At the time of the 
Columbia University decision, more than 64,000 students in at least twenty-
eight colleges had organized.37 
In sharp contrast to the relative success achieved by unions at these 
public universities, students at private universities, until very recently, have 
almost universally been excluded from collective bargaining.38  This 
dichotomy can be blamed on the disparate legal standards governing each 
group of students.  At public universities, the labor laws of a particular state 
govern the right to organize.39  State legislatures may freely grant students at 
public universities the right to unionize, and many have so chosen.40  On the 
other hand, the uniform standard of the NLRA governs essentially all private 
universities in the United States.41  As set forth in detail below, the NLRB 
has historically refused to grant graduate assistants the right to unionize,42 
which meant that a proposed student union at a private university could gain 
recognition only in the unlikely event that a university voluntarily chose to 
accept it.43  Given the vigor with which these schools have opposed student 
 
 36  EDMUND DAVID CRONON & JOHN W. JENKINS, 4 THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN: A 
HISTORY 495–96 (1999), http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/UW/UW-idx?type=article&
did=UW.UWHist19451971v4.i0019&id=UW.UWHist19451971v4&.  In addition to its 
desire to improve pay and working conditions, the Wisconsin teaching assistants’ union 
originated out of a wish for educational reform and anti-war activism.  Id. at 494.  For a 
detailed look at the early days of the Wisconsin union, see id. at 494–506. 
 37  Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *9 (Aug. 23, 2016) (citing J. Berry 
& M. Savarese, Directory of U.S. Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions of 
Higher Education (2012)). 
 38  See Robert A. Epstein, Note, Breaking Down the Ivory Tower Sweatshops: Graduate 
Student Assistants and Their Elusive Search for Employee Status on the Private University 
Campus, 20 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 157, 163 (2006). 
 39  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ . . . shall not include the United 
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or . . . any State or political subdivision 
thereof.”).  See generally Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1358, 1361–88 (1982) (discussing various doctrinal distinctions between public 
and private labor law). 
 40  As of 2010, fourteen states had conferred this right.  Josh Rinschler, Note, Students or 
Employees? The Struggle over Graduate Student Unions in America’s Private Colleges and 
Universities, 36 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 615, 619 n.25 (2010); see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
3562(e) (West 2016). 
 41  Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334 (1970) (asserting jurisdiction over private 
universities that have a substantial impact on interstate commerce). 
 42  See infra Part IV. 
 43  Only one university—New York University—has ever voluntarily recognized such a 
BOCCIO (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2017  11:33 AM 
198 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:193 
unionization, it should come as no surprise that not a single private university 
voluntarily recognized a student union until 2013.44 
III. THE NLRA 
In the midst of the Great Depression in 1935, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt signed the NLRA into law.45  As amended by the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act,46 the NLRA provides important protections to employees 
throughout the country.47  Congress specified the NLRA’s purpose within 
the first section of the Act: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to 
eliminate . . . certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce . . . by encouraging . . . collective bargaining and by 
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own 
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions 
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.48 
The focus on the protection of commerce was crucial to the Act’s 
survival during early challenges under the Commerce Clause,49 and it 
remains an important factor today in determining who receives the Act’s 
protections.50 
In furtherance of the above policy, the NLRA confers upon employees 
“the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representation of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.”51  The Act also prohibits employers and labor organizations 
from engaging in certain “unfair labor practices” that would interfere with 
 
union.  Press Release, New York University, Joint Statement of NYU and GSOC and SET, 
UAW (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/news/2013/november/
joint-statement-of-nyu-and-gsoc-and-set-uaw.html.  As part of its agreement with NYU, the 
union agreed to withdraw a pending petition before the NLRB.  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board Revisited, 
14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 24, 27 (2014) (footnotes omitted). 
 46  29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. § 151. 
 49  See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1937). 
 50  See § 160(a) (“The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in 
any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”) (emphasis added).  As discussed in greater 
detail below, opponents of student unionization cite the NLRA’s principal objective of 
facilitating the free flow of commerce to justify excluding students from coverage under the 
Act.  See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 496 (2004) (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 
N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999)) (“The vision of a fundamentally economic relationship between 
employers and employees is inescapable.”). 
 51  § 157. 
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these rights.52 
A. The Structure and Function of the NLRB 
Rather than leaving the administration of the NLRA to the courts, 
Congress created an administrative agency—the NLRB.53  The Board is 
headed by a five-member panel appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.54  The five members each serve staggered five-
year terms,55 with the term of one member expiring each year.56  Once 
appointed and confirmed, Board members may only be removed by the 
President after a hearing “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”57  
Although the Act does not mandate bi-partisanship, tradition dating back to 
the Eisenhower administration dictates that the Board be comprised of three 
members from the President’s party and two from the opposing party.58  In 
addition to the five-member panel, the Board maintains Regional Offices 
throughout the county, each of which falls under the supervision of a 
Regional Director.59 
The NLRB has two primary functions: to prevent unfair labor 
practices60 and to hold and regulate representation elections.61  Under the 
Administrative Procedures Act,62 the Board has two rulemaking tools it can 
employ to accomplish these goals:63 the promulgation of administrative 
regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations (“notice-and-comment 
rulemaking”)64 and adjudication through quasi-judicial proceedings.65  
 
 52  See generally Gerilynn Falasco & William J. Jackson, The Graduate Assistant Labor 
Movement, NYU and its Aftermath: A Study of the Attitudes of Graduate Teaching and 
Research Assistants at Seven Universities, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 753, 756–57 (2004). 
 53  § 153(a).  For an overview of the rationale behind the decision to create the Board, see 
Daniel P. O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and Methods 
of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 182–83 (2008). 
 54  § 153(a). 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. (“[A]ny individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the 
unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed.”); O’Gorman, supra note 53, at 187. 
 57  § 153(a). 
 58  William B. Gould IV, Politics and the Effect on the National Labor Relations Board’s 
Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes, 64 EMORY L.J. 1501, 1507–08 (2015); see Members 
of the NLRB since 1935, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-
we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
 59  GORMAN, supra note 17, at 74. 
 60  29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012). 
 61  § 159(c); see O’Gorman, supra note 53, at 181. 
 62  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012). 
 63  29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (“The Board shall have authority . . . to make, amend, and 
rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.”). 
 64  5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 65  Id. § 554. 
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Creating an administrative regulation through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking entails a three-step process.  First, an agency must publish notice 
of the proposed rule in the Federal Register.66  Second, interested persons 
must have the opportunity to make comments and argue for or against the 
proposed rule.67  Finally, the agency must provide a “concise general 
statement” of the basis and purpose behind the rule.68 
Despite its administrative rulemaking powers, the Board has almost 
exclusively chosen to resolve disputes and develop precedent through 
adjudication.69  The major cases discussed in this Comment came before the 
Board via a specific type of proceeding that falls under the Board’s authority 
to regulate elections.  First, a group of workers who desire representation (in 
this case students) petition the Regional Office to request a representation 
election.70  The Regional Office will then determine: (1) whether the 
petitioners fall within the scope of the NLRA;71 and (2) if so, whether the 
petitioners constitute “an appropriate unit for collective bargaining.”72  A 
determination by a Regional Director may be appealed to the five-member 
Board for review on specified grounds.73  Through this mechanism, the 





 66  Id. § 553(b).  The notice must include “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature 
of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is 
proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved.”  Id. 
 67  § 553(c). 
 68  Id. 
 69  N.L.R.B. v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 445 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)).  See generally 
Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 
64 EMORY L.J. 1469, 1471 (2015).  See infra Part V.A. for a discussion of the pros and cons 
of this approach by the Board.  Part V will argue that the Board should exercise its rulemaking 
authority to define and protect the rights of student-employees. 
 70  O’Gorman, supra note 53, at 81. 
 71  See, e.g., N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1220 (2000). 
 72  Id. at 1221. 
 73  29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c). The Board will only grant review where (1) “A substantial 
question of law or policy is raised;” (2) “the regional director’s decision on a substantial 
factual issue is clearly [and prejudicially] erroneous;” (3) “the conduct of any hearing or any 
ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error” or (4) “there 
are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or policy.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 102.67(d). 
 74  See infra Part IV. 
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B. Jurisdictional Limits of the NLRB 
Before the NLRB may hear a case, it must grapple with constitutional 
and self-imposed limits on its jurisdiction.  Congress vested the NLRB with 
“the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the 
Commerce Clause.”75  Therefore, the Board has authority over any business 
that engages in or substantially affects interstate commerce.76 
Even if this constitutional test is satisfied, the NLRB has the discretion 
to decline jurisdiction when hearing a case would not effectuate the policies 
of the Act, or would not be an appropriate use of the Board’s limited 
resources.77  An excellent example occurred recently in the university 
context.  In Northwestern University, the Board declined to assert 
jurisdiction over scholarship football players seeking to unionize, reasoning 
that a ruling that addressed only the employment status of athletes at private 
institutions would not promote the stability of labor relations in an “industry” 
dominated by public universities.78 
C. The Shifting Ideologies of the NLRB 
Throughout its history, and particularly during the last few decades, the 
NLRB has garnered a somewhat infamous reputation for being highly 
politicized.79  Frequent turnover in the Board’s composition through the 
appointment procedure discussed above80 leads to frequent reversals in 
decisions regarding controversial topics.81  This is because the Board is not 
 
 75  N.L.R.B. v. Le Fort Enters., Inc., 791 F.3d 207, 209 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing N.L.R.B. 
v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963)). 
 76  R.W. Harmon & Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 664 F.2d 248, 250 (10th Cir. 1981), overruled 
on other grounds by Aramark Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 179 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 77  29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012) (“The Board, in its discretion, may . . . decline to assert 
jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where . . . 
the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the 
exercise of its jurisdiction.”); see, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Somerville Const. Co., 206 F.3d 752, 755 
n.3 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the Board asserts jurisdiction over a non-retail business only if its 
gross outflow or inflow across state lines exceeds $50,000); N.L.R.B. v. Dredge Operators, 
Inc., 19 F.3d 206, 212 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Offshore Express Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 378 
(1983)) (discussing the Board’s refusal of jurisdiction over a United States Navy vessel 
operating on a remote island in the Indian Ocean).  In addition to these standards developed 
through adjudication, the Board has occasionally exercised its notice-and-comment 
rulemaking authority to codify jurisdictional standards for specific industries.  See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 103.1 (colleges); 29 C.F.R. § 103.2 (symphony orchestras); 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (“horseracing 
and dogracing”). 
 78  Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *3 (Aug. 17, 2015).  
 79  GORMAN, supra note 17, at 87–88.  For a detailed analysis on the wisdom of the 
Board’s structure and operating procedure, see Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, 
The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and 
Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2077–84 (2009). 
 80  See discussion supra p. 200. 
 81  Rinschler, supra note 40, at 618–19.  For a continuously updated list of Board 
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bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and can disregard its precedents 
whenever it has “adequately explicated the basis of its [new] 
interpretation.”82  As a Canadian commentator astutely noted: “In the United 
States where, because of legislative paralysis, there has been no major labour 
law reform for 50 years, the government in power influences the direction of 
labour relations policy through its appointments.”83 
While this trend has prevailed for decades, it does not date back to the 
Act’s inception.  Congress initially envisioned the Board as a nonpartisan 
body.84  In the early years of the Board, Democratic Presidents Roosevelt 
and Truman appointed Board members almost exclusively from government 
service or academia.85  This policy changed when President Eisenhower, the 
first Republican president since the New Deal, appointed management-
friendly members to the Board.86  After the Board completed its 
transformation following Eisenhower’s third appointment, it reversed 
several prevailing Board precedents.87  Since Eisenhower, the Board has 
frequently overruled decisions put into place by the prior administration.88 
The effects of the Board’s politicization are exacerbated by the 
deferential standard federal courts accord to the Board’s interpretation of the 
NLRA.89  With specific regard to the Act’s statutory definition of 
“employee,” the Supreme Court has indicated that it will uphold any 
interpretation that is “reasonably defensible.”90  Although the Supreme Court 
has not yet had the occasion to address the employment status of student-
 
compositions dating back to the NLRA’s inception, see Members of the NLRB since 1935, 
N.L.R.B., https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited Sept. 8, 
2017). 
 82  Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. 
N.L.R.B., 802 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 
251, 267 (1975)). 
 83  Kevin Burkett, The Politicization of Ontario Labour Relations, 6 CANADIAN LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 161, 173 (1998). Burkett’s observation rings particularly true in the university 
context, where the NLRB has repeatedly shifted its policy.  See infra Part IV. 
 84  Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 
1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1363 (2000) (internal citation omitted). 
 85  Id. at 1365–66. 
 86  Id. at 1368–69. 
 87  B. Glenn George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation 
Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667, 668 n.14 (1985).  For a contemporary view on the policy-
shift by the Eisenhower Board, see Directors of the Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 
The NLRB Under Republican Administration: Recent Trends and Their Political 
Implications, 55 COLUM L. REV. 852 (1955). 
 88  See, e.g., Harold J. Datz, When One Board Reverses Another: A Chief Counsel’s 
Perspective, 1 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 71–80 (2011). 
 89  See generally Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations 
Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 191–94 (2009). 
 90  Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 517 U.S. 392, 409 (1996) (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984). 
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employees, based on the controversial nature of the topic, it likely would 
uphold the decision of the Board. 
IV. THE NLRB’S EVER-CHANGING STANCE TOWARDS STUDENT-
EMPLOYEES 
The NLRB’s journey to Columbia University has been far from smooth.  
Since the early 1950s, the Board has struggled with questions of whether to 
extend the protections of the NLRA to educational institutions and, if so, 
whether those protections apply to students in addition to faculty.91  The 
Board’s jurisprudence in this area has been riddled with decisions that 
reverse some precedents, narrow others into near-oblivion, and generally 
leave both students and universities wondering what will happen when a new 
president takes office.  This Part begins with an overview of the general 
analytical framework used by the Board in making its employee-
classification decisions, followed by the history and development of NLRB 
employment classification in the academic context through a case-by-case 
analysis. 
A. Analytical Framework 
Though the precise framework utilized in each decision has varied, the 
cases discussed below have more or less employed a two-prong test to 
determine whether to classify students as employees under the NLRA.  First, 
the Board has looked to the plain meaning of the words “employee” and 
“employer,” as defined by section 2 of the Act, to determine whether students 
and the universities they work for satisfy those definitions.92  Second, even 
if it determined that the petitioning students fell within the literal meaning of 
the statute, the Board has looked to the policies underlying the Act to 
determine whether the students should nonetheless be excluded.93 
1. Statutory Definitions 
Section 2 of the NLRA defines both “employee” and “employer,” but 
does not affirmatively describe either term.94  Instead, each definition 
 
 91  See infra pp. 207-18. 
 92  Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *4–6 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 93  Id. at *6–13. 
 94  29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).  Section 2(3) unhelpfully defines “employee” as “any 
employee.”  § 152(3). 
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contains a list of persons who are not employers95 or employees.96  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that when Congress uses the term 
“employee” without defining it, it reflects the common law agency doctrine 
of the conventional master-servant relationship.97  Therefore, since section 2 
excludes neither students nor universities, the debate over this prong turns 
on whether students and universities have a common-law employment 
relationship under the law of agency.98 
As typically defined in the labor-law context, a common-law 
employment relationship exists when a servant performs services (1) for the 
benefit of another, (2) under the other’s control or right of control, and (3) in 
return for payment.99  Two specific issues typically arise in the university 
context: whether a student performs work for the benefit of the university, or 
for his own benefit;100 and whether a student who performs services does so 
in return for compensation, or merely receives compensation independently 
of any work actually performed.101 
2. Policy Considerations 
Even if the employee and employer fall under the literal meaning of the 
statute, the Board may nonetheless exclude certain parties from the NLRA if 
it would not further the Act’s policies to extend them coverage.102  For 
 
 95  As noted above, the NLRA extends coverage only to employees of private employers.  
See § 152(2).  The section 2(2) definition of “employer” further excludes “[(1)] any person 
subject to the Railway Labor Act, . . . [(2)] any labor organization (other than when acting as 
an employer), [and (3)] anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor 
organization.”  Id. 
 96  The section 2(3) definition of “employee” excludes (1) agricultural laborers, (2) 
workers “in the domestic service of any family or person at his home,” (3) persons employed 
by a parent or spouse, (4) independent contractors, (5) supervisors, (6) “any individual 
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act,” and (7) anyone employed by a 
person who is not an “employer” under section 152(2).  § 152(3).  
 97  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320 (1992) (ERISA); Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (Copyright Act of 1976). 
 98  Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *15–18 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 99  N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90–91, 93–95 (1995). 
 100  See Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974) (finding research 
assistants perform work “to advance their own academic standing”). 
 101  See id. at 621 (“[P]ayments to the R[esearch] A[ssistants] are in the nature of stipends 
or grants to permit them to pursue their advanced degrees and are not based on the skill or 
function of the particular individual or the nature of the research performed.”). 
 102  See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 488, 491 (2004) (“[A]ssuming arguendo that 
[graduate-assistants are common-law employees], it does not follow that they are employees 
within the meaning of the Act.  The issue of employee status under the Act turns on whether 
Congress intended to cover the individual in question.”).  The need for this second piece of 
the analysis stems from the canon of statutory construction stating that a regulatory statute 
should not be read in isolation, but as part of the entire regulatory scheme.  FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000).  This second prong can also be 
justified based on the Board’s express authority to decline jurisdiction when a particular labor 
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instance, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., the Supreme Court held that 
“managerial employees” fall outside the Act’s protection because they are 
“so clearly outside the [NLRA] that no specific exclusionary provision was 
thought necessary.”103  The Court reasoned that holding otherwise would 
“eviscerate the traditional distinction between labor and management.”104  
For a less extreme example, the Board in Goodwill Industries of Tidewater 
excluded clients of a non-profit organization that provided training to 
handicapped individuals in order to help them enter the workforce.105  The 
non-profit entered into a contract with a local naval base whereby its 
handicapped clients provided janitorial services for the base.106  Although 
the local naval base paid the clients wages and the clients worked alongside 
non-handicapped employees of the non-profit, the Board nonetheless 
excluded them from the Act because they had a “primarily rehabilitative” 
relationship with their employer and worked under conditions not typical of 
the private sector.107 
B.  1951-1970: The Board Asserts Jurisdiction over Private 
Universities 
Throughout the first few decades after the enactment of the NLRA, it 
was unclear whether the Act’s protections would extend to academic 
institutions at all, much less to students.  Congress had originally exempted 
non-profit hospitals from the Act,108 but made no such exclusion for 
universities, leaving the issue open.  In the two cases that follow, the Board 
juggled the threshold questions of whether universities fell within its 
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause and, if so, whether the Act’s 
policies justified classifying universities as statutory employers. 
1. Columbia University (1951) 
The Board first addressed the application of the NLRA to the academic 
setting in Columbia University (1951),109 when it heard a petition filed on 
 
dispute does not affect commerce sufficiently to justify the use of the Board’s resources.  29 
U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012); see supra pp. 10–11. 
 103  N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283 (1974). 
 104  Id.; see also N.L.R.B. v. Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 
179 (1981) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946)) (upholding exclusion 
of “employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise 
‘managerial’ functions in the field of labor relations.”). 
 105  Goodwill Indus. of Tidewater, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 767, 767 (1991). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 767–78. 
 108  Trs. of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 424 (1951).  Congress subsequently 
amended section 2(2) to eliminate this exclusion.  Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 
88 Stat. 395. 
 109  This designation distinguishes the 1951 case from the 2016 Columbia University 
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behalf of clerical employees working in the libraries of Columbia 
University.110  The Board first found that the University “affect[ed] 
commerce sufficiently” to fall within its Commerce Clause jurisdiction.111  
However, the Board held that it would not further the policies of the Act to 
assert jurisdiction over a “nonprofit, educational institution where the 
activities involved are noncommercial in nature and intimately connected the 
charitable purposes and educational activities of the institution.”112  A key 
component of the Board’s reasoning was that since Congress had expressly 
excluded non-profit hospitals from the NLRA, it therefore likely would not 
have wanted to extend coverage to non-profit colleges.113 
2. Cornell University (1970) 
Nearly twenty years after Columbia University (1951), the Board 
reversed course in Cornell University, which involved faculty at Cornell and 
Syracuse Universities.114  The Board began by noting that since the section 
2(2) definition of “employer” does not specifically exclude them, non-profit 
colleges clearly fall within the plain meaning of the statute.115  Moving to 
policy concerns, the Board rejected the notion that the congressional 
exclusion of non-profit hospitals somehow inferred an intent to deny 
coverage to university employees.116  Next, after reviewing evidence 
showing that universities “have not only a substantial, but massive, impact 
on interstate commerce,” the Board overturned Columbia University (1951) 
and asserted jurisdiction over “nonprofit, private educational institutions 
whose operations have a substantial effect on [interstate] commerce.”117 
C.  1972-1999: The Board Kicks Graduate Assistants to the Curb 
Since Cornell University, the Board has continuously exercised 
jurisdiction over faculty at private colleges.  With that issue firmly decided, 
the Board’s attention turned to whether students should be extended the 
Act’s protections as well.  Two years after Cornell University, the Board 
decided Adelphi University, which concerned a petition by a bargaining unit 
 
decision that granted students the ability to unionize.  See infra pp. 212–14. 
 110  Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424. 
 111  Id. at 425.  
 112  Id. at 427. 
 113  Id.  
 114  Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). 
 115  Id. at 329. 
 116  Id. at 331–32. 
 117  Id. at 332, 334.  The Board subsequently refined this test and, in a rare exercise of its 
notice-and-comment rulemaking authority, determined that it would assert jurisdiction only 
over colleges or universities that generated at least $1 million in gross annual profits.  29 
C.F.R. § 103.1 (2016). 
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consisting of both a university’s regular faculty and graduate assistants.118  
The Adelphi University Board excluded the graduate assistants from the unit, 
reasoning that the students did not “share a sufficient community of interest” 
with the faculty because they were “primarily students.”119  Although 
Adelphi University did not address the assistants’ statutory employment 
status, subsequent Board decisions would latch onto this “primary students” 
language as a rationale for denying coverage to student assistants 
altogether.120 
1. Leland Stanford Junior University (1974) 
The Board finally directly addressed the employment status of certain 
graduate assistants in Leland Stanford Junior University.121  Leland Stanford 
addressed a group of research assistants in Stanford’s physics department 
who received compensation from the university in the form of stipends or 
grants.122  The students in question were all Ph.D. candidates who were 
obligated to perform independent research as part of their doctoral 
programs.123  However, before allowing independent research, Stanford 
required the candidates to perform specified research under supervision to 
“prepare the student for selection of a topic for a dissertation” and “to 
determine the student’s interest and ability.”124 
Based on the above facts, the Board dismissed an election petition filed 
on behalf the students because it did not consider the research assistants to 
be “employees” within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA.125  This 
conclusion, however, came as somewhat of an afterthought towards the end 
of the Board’s opinion.126  The crux of the Board’s reasoning can be properly 
thought of in terms of the two-pronged common-law/policy framework 
outlined above.127  Regarding the common-law definition of employee,128 the 
Board reasoned that (1) the assistants performed research “to advance their 
own academic standing,” and thus not for the benefit of the employer;129 and 
 
 118  Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972). 
 119  Id. at 640. 
 120  See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004); St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 
N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1977). 
 121  Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974). 
 122  Id. at 621. 
 123  Id. at 621–22. 
 124  Id. at 622. 
 125  Id. at 623. 
 126  Id. 
 127  See discussion supra, pp. 205–07. 
 128  A common-law employment relationship exists when a servant performs services (1) 
for the benefit of another, (2) under the other’s control or right of control, and (3) in return for 
payment.  N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90–91, 93–95 (1995). 
 129  Leland Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 623. 
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(2) the University dispersed stipends to help the students pursue a degree, 
and thus, not in return for services.130  As for policy concerns, the Board 
noted that the assistants and Stanford did not have a traditional employment 
relationship because, while an employee may be fired for unsatisfactory 
performance, a research assistant would merely receive a failing grade.131  
Based on these findings, and building off Adelphi University, the Board held 
the assistants to be “primarily students” and thus, not employees.132 
2. The Teaching Hospital Cases (1976-1999) 
In the years that followed Leland Stanford, the Board refined what 
became known as the “primary-purpose” test in a different, but related, 
setting—teaching hospitals.  In two similar decisions in the late 1970s, the 
Board dismissed petitions seeking representation elections for bargaining 
units consisting of interns and residents who worked at certain hospitals.133  
Like graduate assistants, these hospital workers performed services and 
received compensation, but unlike graduate assistants, they already had their 
degrees and were working to fulfill licensing requirements to practice 
medicine.134  Nevertheless, the Board held that since the primary purpose of 
the residents’ work was educational, the residents should be excluded from 
the Act.135  Unlike the common-law-centric approach taken in Leland 
Stanford, the Board relied almost exclusively on policy considerations to 
make its determinations.  In particular, the Board in St. Clare’s Hospital 
expressed concerns that collective bargaining would infringe on academic 
freedom and hinder the interns’ ability to receive an effective education.136 
This status quo persisted until 1999, when a Board composed of 
President Clinton’s appointees137 decided Boston Medical Center and 
reassessed the employment status of medical residents and interns.138  In a 
3–2 decision, the Board reversed both St. Clare’s Hospital and Cedars-Sinai 
Medical Center and held that interns, residents, and fellows employed by a 
 
 130  Id. at 622. 
 131  Id. at 623. 
 132  Id.  
 133  St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 
223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976). 
 134  Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253. 
 135  St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002; Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253. 
 136  St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003. 
 137  Like previous Boards, the Clinton NLRB had no issue overturning precedents put into 
place by previous administrations.  See, e.g., Springs Indus., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 40 (2000) 
(overturning Kokomo Tube Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 357 (1986) and finding that the Board should 
presume that an unlawful threat of plant closing disseminated to one worker was also 
disseminated to additional workers).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Springs Industries was itself 
overruled by the Bush Board in Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776 (2004). 
 138  Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999). 
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teaching hospital are statutory employees under the Act.139  The majority 
reasoned that the educational benefits received by the hospital workers did 
not have any bearing on employment status.140  This rationale became crucial 
in the student-assistant cases that followed. 
D. 2000-Present: NLRB Indecisiveness 
With the Board’s decision in Boston Medical Center, commentators 
began to speculate whether the Clinton Board would reverse course from 
Leland Stanford and extend the Act’s protections to graduate assistants as 
well.141  Shortly thereafter, the Clinton Board answered when it granted 
statutory employment status to certain graduate assistants for the first time. 
1. New York University (2000) 
In New York University, the NLRB heard a petition by a union seeking 
to represent teaching and research assistants at New York University 
(NYU).142  Turning first to the statutory definition of employee, the Board 
found that graduate assistants fall within the plain meaning of “any 
employee” under section 2(3) of the NLRA and the common law.143  In doing 
so, the Board explicitly rejected several arguments, including some that the 
Leland Stanford Board had found persuasive.144  First, the University argued 
that graduate assistants spent only about fifteen percent of their time 
performing duties for the University.145  The Board rejected this argument 
and analogized the graduate assistants to part-time employees, who had been 
previously adjudicated to be statutory employees.146  Next, NYU claimed 
that graduate assistants receive “financial aid” and not “compensation,” and 
may receive the same funding even if they perform no work.147  To this, the 
Board responded: 
[T]he graduate assistants, unlike the students receiving financial 
aid, perform work . . . for the Employer under terms and 
conditions controlled by the Employer.  That this is work in 
 
 139  Id. at 152.  Unlike the graduate-assistant cases, Boston Medical Center has never been 
overturned. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B No. 90, at *3 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 140  See Boston Med., 330 N.L.R.B. at 160 (“[W]hatever other description may be fairly 
applied to house staff, it does not preclude a finding that individuals in such positions are, 
among other things, employees as defined by the Act.”). 
 141  See, e.g., Bernhard Wolfgang Rohrbacher, Comment, After Boston Medical Center: 
Why Teaching Assistants Should Have the Right to Bargain Collectively, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1849 (2000). 
 142  N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 (2000). 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. at 1205–07. 
 145  Id. at 1206. 
 146  Id. (citing Univ. of S.F., 265 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1982)). 
 147  Id. at 1206–07. 
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exchange for pay, and not solely the pursuit of education, is 
highlighted by the absence of any academic credit for virtually all 
graduate assistant work.  Indeed, in most cases graduate assistants 
have completed their coursework and are working on their 
dissertation while performing this work.148 
Finally, the Board rejected the notion that the students performed their 
work primarily in furtherance of a degree, noting that most degrees did not 
even require working as a graduate assistant.149 
Having found the petitioning students to be common-law employees, 
the Board then rejected the University’s policy arguments for excluding the 
graduate assistants.  First, it found that the students had a “traditional 
economic relationship” with the University because the assistants’ 
relationship with the University mirrored that of the faculty.150  Next, the 
Board briefly addressed concerns that “extending collective-bargaining 
rights to graduate assistants would infringe on the [University’s] academic 
freedom.”151  The Board summarily dismissed this argument, reasoning that 
(1) any issue of academic freedom can be resolved through collective 
bargaining, and (2) the NLRA does not require employers to agree to 
anything.152 
Essentially, New York University was a sound rejection of the “primary-
purpose test,” with the Board explicitly holding that an educational benefit 
does not preclude statutory employment status.153  Based on this holding and 
the reasoning above, the Board concluded that most of NYU’s teaching 
assistants and research assistants were statutory employees entitled to a 
representation election.154  The decision, however, excluded a class of 
research assistants funded by external grants who performed no research 
outside that needed to obtain a degree.155  The decision of the Regional 
Director adopted by the Board reasoned that these assistants do not actually 
perform a service for another in exchange for compensation, and thus cannot 
be considered “employees” under the Act.156  The exclusion of research 
assistants thus left Leland Stanford intact, albeit with a very narrow scope. 
 
 148  N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1207. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at 1207–08. As noted above, university faculty indisputably fall within the NLRA. 
Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 332 (1970). 
 151  N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1208. 
 152  Id. (citing N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 45 (1937)). 
 153  Id. at 1207. 
 154  Id. at 1205, 1221. 
 155  Id. at 1221.  
 156  Id.  This issue was not appealed to the Board.  See id. at 1205 n.5. 
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2. Brown University (2004) 
In the wake of New York University, unionization efforts began almost 
immediately at several private universities with varying degrees of 
success.157  At NYU, students successfully negotiated the first collectively-
bargained contract between graduate assistants and a private university in the 
nation’s history.158  This victory for student employees proved to be short-
lived.  Only four years later, but well into the George W. Bush 
administration, the Board overruled New York University.  This 
determination came in an appeal from a Regional Director’s decision to grant 
an election to teaching assistants, research assistants, and proctors at Brown 
University.159  The Brown University Board reversed the Regional Director 
and held that even if assistants are employees at common law (an issue which 
it did not decide), “it does not follow that they are employees within the 
meaning of the Act.”160  Instead, the Board excluded graduate assistants from 
the Act based on two policy concerns unique to the university context: (1) 
the “primarily educational” relationship between students and universities, 
and (2) the ever-lurking threat to academic freedom.161 
The Board stressed that the policies behind the Act only justified 
extending protection to employees who have a “fundamentally economic” 
relationship with their employer.162  Accordingly, it revived the briefly-
deceased “primary-purpose” test and held that individuals who are primarily 
students cannot be statutory employees under the NLRA.163  Employing this 
test, the Board found that the assistants had a primarily educational 
relationship with Brown, and emphasized that: students must be enrolled at 
Brown to receive a teaching assistant position, research assistant position, or 
proctorship;164 the money received by the teaching assistants, research 
assistants, and proctors was the same received by fellows (who perform no 
services), making it financial aid and not “consideration for work;”165 and 
most graduate students were pursuing a Ph.D., and unlike the assistants at 
 
 157  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Grad Students Reject Union in Yale Vote, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 2, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/02/nyregion/grad-students-reject-union-in-
yale-vote.html. 
 158  Karen W. Arenson & Steven Greenhouse, N.Y.U. and Union Agree on Graduate-
Student Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/30/nyregion/nyu-
and-union-agree-on-graduate-student-pay.html.  As noted above, such contracts had been 
negotiated at many public universities.  See supra p. 197. 
 159  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). 
 160  Id. at 491. 
 161  Id. at 492–93. 
 162  Id. at 488 (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999)). 
 163  Id. at 493. 
 164  Id. at 488. 
 165  Brown Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 485, 488. 
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NYU,166 most departments at Brown required teaching as a condition of 
receiving a doctorate.167  The Board expressly declined to give any weight to 
empirical evidence showing the changing financial and corporate structure 
of universities, reasoning that this had no bearing on whether graduate 
assistants are primarily students.168 
Turning to academic freedom, the Board relied heavily on St. Clare’s 
Hospital169 and found that extending NLRA coverage to graduate students 
would infringe upon academic freedom.170  Specifically, the Board feared 
that purely academic issues would be subject to collective bargaining, 
including class size, time, length, and location; decisions over who, what, 
and where to teach or research; standards for advancement and graduation; 
and the administration of exams.171  The Board also expressed concerns that 
collective bargaining would jeopardize the “intensely personal” nature of the 
student-faculty relationship.172  Finally, the Board rejected evidence that 
some collective-bargaining agreements have been entered into at universities 
with no intrusion into the educational process, essentially reasoning that past 
performances do not guarantee future outcomes.173 
3. Columbia University (2016) 
The building unionization movement at private universities came to a 
screeching halt after the Board’s decision in Brown University.  At NYU, the 
University refused to negotiate a second contract after the initially bargained 
agreement expired.174  This state of affairs prevailed for over a decade, until 
a Board composed of President Obama’s appointees heard a petition from a 
 
 166  N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1207 (2000). 
 167  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 488. 
 168  Id. at 492. 
 169  St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).  As noted above, St. 
Clare’s Hospital was overruled by Boston Medical Center, 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).  The 
Brown University Board distinguished Boston Medical because the hospital workers in that 
case had already earned their degrees, while the graduate assistants here had not.  Brown 
Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487.  As for the holding of Boston Medical itself, the Board cryptically 
stated that “[w]e need not decide whether [that case] was correctly decided.”  Id.  The Bush 
Board never had a chance to reassess the employment status of hospital interns and residents. 
 170  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. at 489–90 (citing St. Clare’s Hospital, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002)). 
 173  Id. at 492 (“Even if some unions have chosen not to intrude into academic 
prerogatives, that does not mean that other unions would be similarly abstemious.”). 
 174  Karen W. Arenson, N.Y.U. Moves to Disband Graduate Students Union, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/17/education/nyu-moves-to-disband-
graduate-students-union.html.  Eight years later, NYU voluntarily re-recognized the graduate-
assistant union.  See Steven Greenhouse, N.Y.U. Graduate Assistants to Join Auto Workers’ 
Union, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/nyregion/nyu-
graduate-assistants-to-join-auto-workers-union.html. 
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union seeking to represent teaching and research assistants at Columbia 
University.175  Unlike prior student-petitions before the NLRB, the proposed 
Columbia University bargaining unit contained undergraduates, as well as 
graduate students.176  Based on the plain meaning of the NLRA and an 
analysis of the policies behind it, the Board again changed course by 
reversing Brown University and extending the Act even further than it did in 
New York University.177 
In a 3-1 decision, Columbia University granted employment status to 
all “student assistants who have a common-law employment relationship 
with their university.”178  First, the Board reaffirmed the principle that all 
common-law employees not specifically excluded by section 2(3) of the 
NLRA fall within the plain meaning of “employee” under the Act.179  The 
Board thus concluded that the Act applied to all student assistants who are 
common-law employees “unless compelling statutory and policy 
considerations require an exception.”180 
The Board went on to find that the “special issues” posed by the 
academic-employment setting do not justify a blanket exclusion of students 
from the Act.181  The majority opinion unequivocally discarded the “primary-
purpose test,” finding that it had no basis in either the policies or the text of 
the NLRA.182  Specifically, the Board rejected Brown University’s 
requirement of a “fundamentally economic” relationship.183  Rather, it held 
that the only economic relationship required by the Act is “the payment of 
tangible compensation.”184  Thus, “a graduate student may be both a student 
and an employee; a university may be both the student’s educator and 
employer.”185 
Rather than completely disregarding threats to academic freedom, as 
the New York University Board did,186 the Board acknowledged that 
“[i]nsofar as the concept of academic freedom implicates the First 
Amendment, the Board certainly must take any such infringement into 
 
 175  Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *1 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 176  Id.  
 177  Id. at *2. 
 178  Id. at *13. 
 179  Id. at *4–6.  
 180  Id. at *6.  The Board further stated, “[w]e do not hold that the Board is required to find 
workers to be statutory employees whenever they are common-law employees, but only that 
the Board may and should find here that student assistants are statutory employees.”  Id. at 
*4. 
 181  Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B No. 90, at *7. 
 182  Id. at *5. 
 183  Id. at *6. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. at *7 (emphasis in original). 
 186  N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B., 1205, 1208 (2000); see discussion supra Part IV.D.1. 
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account.”187  The majority, however, held that a generic threat to academic 
freedom could not justify a blanket exclusion because: (1) the Act mandates 
only employers to bargain over “wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment,”188 and (2) the Board can address specific First 
Amendment issues on a case by case basis.189  Based primarily on these 
reasons, the Board held that the NLRA extends to all student assistants with 
a common-law employment relationship with their university.190 
Lastly, the Columbia University Board considered whether the 
petitioning teaching and research assistants were, in fact, common-law 
employees.191  As for the teaching assistants, the Board found that those 
students provided important instructional work for the university in 
exchange for compensation.192  The majority then held that whether or not 
completion of a degree required teaching had no bearing on the employment-
status inquiry.193  With respect to research assistants, the Board fully 
overruled Leland Stanford, and departed from New York University insofar 
as that decision held that externally funded research assistants were not 
statutory or common-law employees.194  The Columbia University Board 
concluded that the student-researchers performed work under the direction 
of the University in exchange for compensation—even if that compensation 
came from a source outside of the school.195  Therefore, the Board deemed 
all of the petitioning students, including undergraduates, statutory employees 
under the NLRA.196 
 
 187  Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *7 (citing N.L.R.B v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding serious First Amendment concerns precluded Board 
from exercising jurisdiction over certain faculty at church-run schools)). 
 188  Id. at *8 (citing First Nat. Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 674–75 (1981)). 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. at *13. 
 191  Id. at *13–18.  As noted above, a common-law employment relationship exists when 
a servant performs services (1) for the benefit of another, (2) under the other’s control or right 
of control, and (3) in return for payment. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 
85, 90–91, 93–95 (1995). 
 192  Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *15. 
 193  Id. at *16 (“[T]he fact that teaching may be a degree requirement in many academic 
programs does not diminish the importance of having students assist in the business of 
universities by providing instructional services for which undergraduate students pay 
tuition.”).    
 194  Id. 
 195  Id. at *17–18.  The opinion did note that “it is theoretically possible that funders may 
wish to further a student’s education by effectively giving the student unconditional 
scholarship aid, and allowing the student to pursue educational goals without regard to 
achieving any of the funder’s own particular research goals.”  Id. at *17.  This presumably 
would not create a common-law employment relationship with the University and would thus 
not be covered under the NLRA. 
 196  Id. at *16, *18.  The Board additionally found that (1) undergraduate, Master’s degree, 
and Ph.D. students shared a sufficient community of interest to constitute an appropriate 
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V. THE FUTURE OF STUDENT-UNIONIZATION: AN ARGUMENT FOR NOTICE-
AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING 
In the months since Columbia University, students at private 
universities have once again begun to organize unionization efforts.  At 
Columbia University, graduate students voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
unionization.197  At Yale, students in eight departments voted to unionize198 
following an order by the Regional Director permitting unionization on a 
department-by-department basis.199  Elections have also been held at 
Harvard200 and Cornell.201 
These developments notwithstanding, students’ right to unionize is far 
from etched in stone.  The political instability of the NLRB means that a 
reconstituted Board could easily reverse course again and return to the 
Brown University “primary-purpose” standard.  This uncertainty makes it 
critical that the employment status of student assistants be decided with some 
semblance of finality.  The Board should act to codify its holding in 
Columbia University and make clear that students in a common-law 
employment relationship with their schools are statutory employees under 
 
collective-bargaining unit; and (2) none of the students were “temporary employees” who 
must be excluded from the unit.  Id. at *18–21.  
 197  Elizabeth A. Harris, Columbia Graduate Students Vote Overwhelmingly to Unionize, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/nyregion/columbia-
graduate-students-union-vote.html.  Following the election, an NLRB officer dismissed 
Columbia’s objections regarding the validity of the elections.  Ginger Adams Otis, Graduate 
Workers at Columbia Get OK from National Labor Relations Board to Join Union, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017, 1:28 P.M.), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/graduate-
workers-columbia-join-union-article-1.2990869. 
 198  Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Yale Graduate Students Vote to Form a Union, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/02/24/yale-
graduate-students-vote-to-form-a-union. 
 199  Ed Stannard, Yale University Graduate Students in 9 Departments Given Right to Hold 
Union Elections, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 25, 2017, 7:33 P.M.), http://www.nhregister.com/
general-news/20170125/yale-university-graduate-students-in-9-departments-given-right-to-
hold-union-elections. 
 200   After the initial election at Harvard resulted in a majority of votes against 
unionization, the Regional Director ordered a re-vote due to concerns over the adequacy of 
eligible voter lists circulated prior to the election.  Caroline S. Engelmayer, Harvard Appeals 
Unionization Vote Ruling to National NLRB, THE HARVARD CRIMSON (Aug. 15, 2017), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/8/15/harvard-appeals-decision-nlrb/.  Harvard has 
appealed the decision to the full NLRB.  Id. 
 201  As of this writing, the election at Cornell was too close to call.  Meg Gordon, With 
New Tactics, Graduate Students Look to Renew Last Year’s Union Effort, THE CORNELL 
DAILY SUN (Aug. 22, 2017), http://cornellsun.com/2017/08/22/with-new-tactics-graduate-
students-look-to-renew-last-years-union-effort/.  Prior to the vote, the administration actively 
campaigned against the union.  See Statement of Hunter R. Rawlings III, Interim President, 
Cornell University, Interim President Rawlings Issues Statement on Graduate Assistant Labor 
Union Representation (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2016/10/
statement-graduate-assistant-unionization. 
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section 2(3) of the NLRA. 
In an ideal world, this job would fall to Congress, which could amend 
the NLRA to specifically include students in the Act.  But, the NLRA has 
not been amended since 1974,202 and Congress may be unlikely to break its 
streak of inaction.  Therefore, the responsibility to craft stable labor 
regulations must fall to the NLRB.  As previously noted, the Board has two 
rulemaking tools—adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking.203  
This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches to 
show why notice-and-comment rulemaking is the only way to eliminate the 
present uncertainty concerning the employment status of students and 
provide guidance and stability moving forward. 
A.  Adjudication vs. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
Both adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking have their 
advantages, but neither is perfectly suited for every situation.204  Yet, this 
fundamental fact appears to be lost on the NLRB, which throughout its 
history has almost exclusively relied on adjudication to set policy and resolve 
disputes.205  Even the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the importance 
of maintaining the flexibility afforded by adjudication in many situations, 
has opined that the Board should promulgate formal rules where 
appropriate.206  Generally speaking, the primary advantages of adjudication 
are flexibility and specificity, while the advantages of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking are clarity and stability. 
1. Advantages of Adjudication 
Adjudication by an agency focuses on particular disputes between 
particular parties and, as such, is “better suited for intensive exploration of 
factual disputes and . . . resol[ution of] narrow policy issues involving 
limited numbers of contestants.”207  Similarly, “the party most immediately 
affected has substantially greater procedural rights than he would have in 
 
 202  Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. 
 203  See discussion supra pp. 200-01. 
 204  Lubbers, supra note 19, at 415 (citing Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy 
Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 162 
(1986)). 
 205  N.L.R.B. v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 445 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)); see generally 
Garden, supra note 69, at 1471. 
 206  See N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]here may be 
situations where the Board’s reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion 
or a violation of the Act.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“The function 
of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this 
quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”). 
 207  Lubbers, supra note 19, at 415 (quoting Berg, supra note 204, at 162). 
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rulemaking.”208  Moreover, adjudication allows the “flexibility to adjust 
standards as novel situations arise or as the agency gains experience.”209  
Adjudication thus forms policy gradually, rather than the all-at-once 
approach of a formal rule.  This gradual rulemaking may be less likely to 
attract unwanted attention from Congress or the Supreme Court.210  As one 
commentator noted, “there is far more at stake when a rule is rejected by a 
federal court than when an adjudicated decision is reversed.”211  The Board 
itself has defended its reliance on adjudication because the “cumbersome 
process of amending formal rules would impede the law’s ability to respond 
quickly and accurately to changing industrial practices.”212 
2. Advantages of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
While adjudication can be an effective mechanism for addressing many 
narrow, fact-specific issues, notice-and-comment rulemaking is typically 
better suited for addressing broader policy concerns.  Rather than waiting for 
aggrieved parties to come before an agency, formal rulemaking allows an 
agency to decide exactly when and how to address an issue.213  Once an 
agency initiates a formal rulemaking proceeding, the comments and 
empirical evidence submitted by the public create a more thorough record, 
and may lead to better decision-making by the agency.214  Additionally, if an 
agency methodically addresses all concerns raised by opponents of the new 
rule, courts may be more likely to show deference to the agency’s decision 
to adopt the rule.215 
Finally, an administrative regulation is binding on all future agency 
adjudications, which may make a particular policy significantly more 
stable.216  In order for an agency to modify or eliminate a regulation, it would 
have to institute another formal rulemaking proceeding.217  As detailed 
above, this process is much more cumbersome than simply announcing a rule 
 
 208  Id. (quoting Berg, supra note 204, at 162). 
 209  Garden, supra note 69, at 1474. 
 210  See id. 
 211  James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 235 (2005). 
 212  Lubbers, supra note 19, at 416 (citing Scott A. Zebrak, Comment, The Future of NLRB 
Rulemaking: Analyzing the Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care 
Bargaining Unit Rule and by the Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. 
U. 125, 129 (1994)). 
 213  Garden, supra note 69, at 1475. 
 214  Id. 
 215  Id. 
 216  Lubbers, supra note 19, at 416. 
 217  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Local 3090 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 751, 
759 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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through adjudication,218 and policy shifts effected through this formal 
mechanism may be more likely to be perceived as legitimate.219 
B.  Application of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking to Student 
Assistants 
The advantages and disadvantages outlined above weigh heavily in 
favor of using notice-and-comment rulemaking to settle the threshold 
question of whether student assistants are “employees” under the NLRA.  
This is not a “novel situation” that requires the Board to retain its flexibility.  
It has been litigated and re-litigated for decades, and although the basic facts 
surrounding student assistants have remained the same, the determinations 
made by the Board have not.  The stability and clarity of a formal 
administrative regulation is necessary to provide finality and to allow 
students and universities to make informed decisions moving forward.  
Similarly, a rule in this context would in no way impede the Board’s ability 
to “respond quickly and accurately to changing industrial practices.”220  
Industrial practices have not changed since New York University; only the 
composition of the NLRB has. 
Importantly, the comment period in a formal rulemaking proceeding 
would give affected persons the opportunity to voice their concerns and 
allow the Board to make an informed decision on whether, or how, it should 
restrict the collective-bargaining rights of students.  Opponents of student-
unionization have raised numerous concerns about applying the NLRA to 
students,221 most of which would undoubtedly be addressed during the 
rulemaking proceeding.  However, one particular concern—the importance 
of academic freedom—merits particular consideration. 
Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it is well settled 
that academic freedom in a university is “a special concern of the First 
Amendment because of the university’s unique role in participating in and 
fostering a marketplace of ideas.”222  Chief Justice Warren best described the 
 
 218  See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see supra pp. 200-01. 
 219  Garden, supra note 69, at 1476. 
 220  Zebrak, supra note 212, at 129. 
 221  For instance, in his dissent in Columbia University, Member Miscimarra enumerated 
an extensive list of “unfortunate consequences” that could stem from the ruling.  Trs. of 
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *29–31 (Aug. 23, 2016).  These potential issues 
include: (1) Schools may withhold, suspend, or delay academic credit if a student-assistant is 
unable to work due to a strike or lockout; (2) Certain disclosures mandated by the NLRA may 
directly conflict with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); (3) Schools 
may not be able to conduct confidential investigations into allegations of sexual harassment; 
and (4) Schools may be restricted from promulgating general rules promoting civility or rules 
barring profanity.  Id.  The merit of these concerns, and of other issues contemplated by the 
Columbia University dissent, falls outside the scope of this Comment. 
 222  Brown v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Keyishian v. 
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importance of maintaining academic freedom in his poignant (if slightly 
dramatic) majority opinion in Sweezy v. State of N.H.: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate 
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and 
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual 
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future 
of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly 
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be 
made. . . . Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.223 
Based on these compelling policy rationales, courts have identified 
“four essential freedoms” afforded to educational institutions: the right to 
decide “who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who 
may be admitted to study.”224 
Concerns over the effect that collective bargaining may have on 
academic freedom could have some merit, but as noted by the Board in 
Columbia University, these concerns cannot justify the complete exclusion 
of students from the NLRA.225  Instead, the Board should specifically carve-
out matters that would infringe on a university’s academic freedom.  The 
statute governing collective bargaining at the University of California 
provides an excellent model for this: 
(q)(1) For purposes of the University of California only . . . [t]he 
scope of representation shall not include any of the following: 
. . . (C) Admission requirements for students, conditions for 
the award of certificates and degrees to students, and the 
content and supervision of courses, curricula, and research 
programs.226 
Other states have imposed similar restrictions (through statute or 
adjudication) on collective bargaining,227 but the California statute provides 
 
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 223  Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
 224  Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)); see also Regents of 
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 n.11 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 
435 U.S. 78, 96, n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)) (“University faculties must have the 
widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students 
and their entitlement to promotion or graduation.”). 
 225  Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B No. 90, at *7. 
 226  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3562(q)(1)(C) (West 2016). 
 227  See, e.g., Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 594 N.W. 2d 491, 497 (Mich. 1999) 
(citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Mich. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 204 N.W. 2d 218 
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the requisite specificity to protect the “four essential freedoms” of 
educational institutions, while leaving students ample bargaining room. 
Undoubtedly, additional issues stemming from the unique position of 
colleges and universities will arise with the passage of time.  If, during the 
notice-and-comment period, the NLRB finds that any other issues merit 
significant consideration, it should adjust its new rule accordingly.  Most of 
these concerns, however, can likely be dealt with on a case-by-case basis and 
are properly left to Board’s adjudicatory process.  The Board should 
therefore exercise its notice-and-comment rulemaking authority to craft a 
regulation specifying that student-workers are statutory employees entitled 
to full collective-bargaining rights, subject to the academic restrictions 
outlined above. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The history of NLRB jurisprudence regarding the employment status 
of student assistants has been muddled and inconsistent.  Now, the Board has 
the opportunity to codify its holding in Columbia University and make it 
significantly more difficult for future administrations to revive the “primary 
purpose” test.  By doing so, the Board can provide much needed guidance 
and clarity to both students and universities and help alleviate the NLRB’s 
reputation for inconsistency.  Perhaps someday Congress will step in to 
amend the NLRA to provide permanent clarity on this issue, but until then, 
the Board should do the next best thing by stepping out of its comfort zone 
and crafting a formal administrative rule. 
 
 
(Mich. 1973)) (“[T]he scope of bargaining . . . may be limited if the subject matter falls clearly 
within the educational sphere”). 
